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OSIA-S-M-14

12 May 1954

**MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION: Operations Coordinating Board
708 Jackson Place
12 May 1954 at 10:00 a.m.**

Members of Survey:

Mr. James Q. Reber, CIA

CIA

CIA

CIA

Observers: OCB

Dr. Horace Craig

Mr. Wallace Irwin

Mr. Neilson C. Debevoise

USIA

Mr. Henry Loomis, SA/Dir

Mr. Louis Olom, CPI

State

Mr. Fisher Howe, Deputy Special
Assistant, Intelligence

Mr. Allan Evans

CIA

Statement of USIA's Intelligence Needs

1. In general OCB does not have intelligence needs in addition to those presented. There were suggestions that the statement could be improved in its form of presentation and that it would be helpful to specifically include "estimates of sociological change."

Incidents Illustrating OCB Needs

2. 17 June 1953 Riots.

The food plan, developed by OCB in response to the riots, was an operating, not an intelligence, responsibility. Implementation of the plan, however, depended upon prompt and accurate data on the hunger situation.

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3. The Lodge (UN) Incident.

One man (Olom) was assigned as intelligence adviser to the OCB group backstopping Lodge.

Need: To obtain declassified bullet-type ammunition for Lodge to fire back at the Soviet.

Need: Memoranda treating Soviet vulnerabilities, e.g.: "Nature of North Korean Government," "Prior Planning of the Soviet Regarding China's Entry Into the Korean War," "Communist Manipulation of POWs." These were developed by OCB individuals on the basis of intelligence (in the first instance) and an intelligence officer from G-2 was assigned to OCB to develop the paper from G-2's files. Eventually these papers also included some State intelligence (some of which was unclassified) and were reviewed for accuracy and possible additions by State intelligence people.

4. OCB Papers for Geneva.

Prepared by OCB people, reviewed by State intelligence (and also G-2), put in final form as press releases through the utilization of an IPS writer sitting down with intelligence. This combination insured accuracy, readability, and appeal.

CPI has suggested that an IPS man be set up close to intelligence in OIR/State to prepare materials on a continuing basis.

5. The foregoing cases required (a) a search for materials responsive to identifiable Soviet vulnerabilities, (b) unclassified or declassified materials, and (c) hard intelligence information.

The decision to use or not to use such materials after they have been declassified, and after intelligence has rendered its best judgment as to the hardness or softness of the material, rests with policy and operations.

Research on International Communism in Latin America.

6. If the OCB paper in question, dated 5 May 1954, were assigned to one intelligence organization for leadership and production, with the cooperation of other agencies having a contribution to

make, there would likely be a better product than there would be if each agency represented on the OCB working group undertook individually to respond to the paper.

7. It was recognized that the way in which we proceed on this immediate and real assignment may be instructive as to how we eventually might organize to meet the government's needs for general studies on International Communism.

8. Generally speaking, intelligence requests by OCB working groups should funnel to intelligence agencies through the special staff under Dr. Craig. Care should be taken to insure that intelligence producers have as clear an impression as possible as to the purpose for which the intelligence requested is to be used.